More Mortgages, Lower Growth? by Bezemer, Dirk et al.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bezemer, D., Grydaki, M. and Zhang, L. 
(2016), MORE MORTGAGES, LOWER GROWTH?. Economic Inquiry, 54: 652–674. doi: 
10.1111/ecin.12254, which has been published in final form at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.12254/abstract. This article may be used for non-
commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving 
More Mortgages, Lower Growth?I
Dirk Bezemera,∗, Maria Grydakib, Lu Zhanga
aFaculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, 9747 AE Groningen, The Netherlands
bDivision of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK
Abstract
In newly collected data on 46 economies over 1990-2011, we show that financial development since 1990
was mostly due to growth in credit to real estate and other asset markets, which has a negative growth
coefficient. We also distinguish between growth effects of stocks and flows of credit. We find positive
growth effects for credit flows to nonfinancial business but not for mortgage and other asset market credit
flows. By accounting for the composition of credit stocks and for the effect of credit flows, we explain
the insignificant or negative growth effects of financial development in recent times. What was true in the
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1. Introduction
A large empirical literature had established the positive effects of the growth in bank credit on output
growth, in data from the 1960s until the mid 2000s.1 Recent research however shows that above a threshold
level, a high credit-to-GDP ratio may slow down rather than boost growth (Shen and Lee, 2006; Rousseau
and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2012; Manganelli and
Popov, 2013; Valickova et al., 2013). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the unconditional growth correlation of
bank credit stocks scaled by GDP across 50 economies since the 1970s. The correlation of credit to output
growth was not significantly different from zero in the 1990s and 2000s. This motivates our paper.
Figure 1: The cross-country credit-growth correlation, 1971-2011
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Note: This figure plots the coefficient estimate of a univariate regression of the private-credit-to-GDP ratio on the real GDP per capita
growth rate for a balanced panel of 50 countries over 1971-2011, using 5-year non-overlapping averages. The countries included are
listed in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Credit data are from the Financial Development and Structure Dataset (Beck et al., 2010). Data on
real GDP per capita growth are from the World Development Indicators. The solid line plots the point estimates and the dashed lines
the boundaries of the 95 percent confidence interval.
Different explanations have been proposed. Wachtel (2011) questions the interpretation of credit/GDP
ratios as indicating financial deepening, and notes it may also indicate increasing financial fragility. Beck
et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2012) identify the growth in non-intermediation activities and in non-enterprise
1This literature builds on Schumpeter (1934), Schumpeter (1939), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Levine
(2005) and Ang (2008) provide overviews. The latest year analyzed in this literature is 2005.
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credit, respectively, as causes of the weakening growth effectiveness of the financial sector. Rousseau and
Wachtel (2011) suggest that since the 1990s, many countries liberalized their financial markets before the
associated legal and regulatory institutions were sufficiently well developed, undermining the positive
impact of financial deepening on growth. Arcand et al. (2012) develop a model in which the expectation
of a bailout may lead to a financial sector which is too large with respect to the social optimum. Cecchetti
and Kharroubi (2013) present evidence that skilled labor is drawn away from R&D intensive industries
into finance during a credit boom, so that the financial sector may grow at the expense of the real sector.
Earlier, Stockhammer (2004) analyzed a causal relation for selected OECD economies between expanding
asset markets and a slowdown in investment.
In this paper, we analyze newly collected data originally reported in national central bank statistics on
four categories of bank credit, for 46 economies over 1990-2011, with country coverage and time period
dictated by data availability. As in several other papers (Beck et al., 2012; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and
Kharroubi, 2012), we observe high growth of credit relative to GDP in this new sample. We also see a rapid
increase of the share of household mortgage debt in total debt, again in line with Beck et al. (2012) and
also with recent findings reported in Bezemer (2014) and Jordà et al. (2014). In Figure 3 in the next section,
we observe in a cross section of countries over 1990-2011 that total domestic bank debt rose from below
80% to over 120% of GDP, with mortgage credit rising from 20% to 50% and credit to nonfinancial business
remaining stable around 40% of GDP. Credit booms in the 1990 and 2000s caused credit to asset markets to
become a large (in some countries, the largest) part of bank credit. For instance, in the Netherlands, credit
to asset markets (mostly, household mortgage credit) accounted for 70% of outstanding loans in 2011, up
from less than 50% in 1990.2
The reasons for the disproportional growth and then defaults in mortgage lending since the 1990s have
been explored in several recent studies. They include policy preferences for increased home ownership and
relaxation of mortgage lending rules(Jordà et al., 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012), credit market deregulation
(Favara and Imbs, 2015), and financial innovations such as new forms of securitization (Jiminez et al., 2014)
as part of the the originate-to-distribute model of lending (Purnanandam, 2011). Softening of loan stan-
dards and securitization were amplified by low policy rates (Maddaloni, 2011), while house price declines
and deteriorating underwriting standards triggered the exceptional rise in defaults from 2007 (Mayer et al.,
2009). In this paper we do not research these and other causes of mortgage credit expansion, but analyze its
effect on output growth. We hypothesize that the use of credit matters to its growth effectiveness. The dis-
tinction is that credit supporting asset transactions may have weaker or negative growth effects compared
2In our dataset, there are seven countries for which we have data going back substantially before 1990: Switzerland, Chile, Ger-
many, Hong Kong, Japan, Portugal and the United States. We plot the development of credit composition in these countries in Figure
A.1 and Figure A.2 in the Appendix. In each of them, the stock of mortgage credit rose faster than the stock of nonfinancial-business
credit especially since the 1990s and except for Hong Kong, this decline occurred mostly in the 2000s.
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to credit supporting transactions in goods and services, as suggested by Werner (1997, 2012). Werner (1997)
applied this insight to data on Japan for the 1980s and 1990s. In this paper we extend this disaggregation
to a large panel of countries.
Our paper is closely related to Beck et al. (2012). This paper was the first, to our knowledge, to decom-
pose bank credit into enterprise credit and household credit. They examined the different effects of these
two types of credit on real sector outcomes for 45 countries over 1994-2005. They show that enterprise
credit is positively associated with growth, whereas household credit is not. The present paper is differ-
ent in several respects. Compared to Beck et al. (2012) who investigate a number of real sector outcomes,
we focus on growth only. While Beck et al. (2012) analyze one aggregate household credit category, we
separate mortgage and consumption credit. The distinction appears important: our results are driven by
mortgage credit, not consumer credit. Further, we observe each credit category independently as reported
in central bank statistics.3 And while Beck et al. (2012) use a cross-section of data, we build a panel data
set for four credit categories over a longer time-period. While this allows for more efficient estimates, our
findings broadly confirm those of Beck et al. (2012).
Our paper also relates to Beck et al. (2014), where the activities of banks are differentiated according to
whether banks intermediate or undertake other, non-intermediation activities. They contrast the credit-to-
GPP-ratio (as proxy for intermediation activities) and the value-added share of the financial sector (as proxy
for size) and find that intermediation activities are positively associated with growth whereas an increase
in size is not. We corroborate their main finding that more finance is not necessarily better. Instead of using
the total-credit-to-GDP ratio to measure the financial intermediation, we focus on how the composition of
financial intermediation activities matters for growth. To do so, we use disaggregated credit-to-GDP ratios
for different credit categories. We now motivate this distinction.
In most of the credit-growth literature to date, ’credit’ is tacitly interpreted as credit to the nonfinan-
cial sector, supporting production of goods and services (for recent exceptions, see Beck et al., 2012, 2014;
Bezemer, 2014; Jordà et al., 2014). Biggs et al. (2010) show that with only nonfinancial-sector credit, the
dynamics of credit, debt and capital are identical, so that the growth effect of credit can indeed only be
positive. The depth of financial markets can then be viewed simply as a measure of economies’ productive
absorption capacity (Masten et al., 2008) and negative growth coefficients present a puzzle.
In contrast, if credit which finances transactions in assets (rather than in goods and services) is included
in the analysis, the growth coefficient need not be positive. Credit growth may now inflate asset markets
rather than leading to growth in GDP. This by itself decreases the credit-growth correlation. It also increases
growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio, since credit stocks grow without (or with much less) growth in GDP.
Why would financial deepening, measured by credit stocks, have a negative impact on output growth?
3We provide a more detailed discussion in the Data Appendix.
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Credit stock measures capture agents’ ability to use finance to reallocate factors of production, which may
support growth. This is the traditional, positive ‘financial development’ effect on growth (King and Levine,
1993). But credit stocks are also debt stocks, which may depress growth through more financial fragility
and larger uncertainty, through larger debt servicing out of income, through a debt overhang effect, or
through a negative wealth effect on consumption. Theoretically, the growth effect of credit stocks is there-
fore ambiguous; with large credit stocks, it may well be negative. What matters is “how large a credit
boom [is] relative to the possibilities of productive uses for loans.”(Lorenzoni, 2008; Boissay et al., 2015).
Credit growth in support of other outcomes than production by nonfinancial business (such as investment
in existing real estate) will result in smaller growth coefficients than credit growth to nonfinancial business.
At high levels of debt, the effect may be negative: a rise in overall debt levels has been widely noted as a
growth retarding factor (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Wachtel, 2011; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Lorenzoni,
2008; Barajas et al., 2013; Reinhart, 2010; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 2013; Boissay et al., 2015).
To the extent that credit for real estate transactions is household mortgage credit, this argument is
reinforced by the literature on household credit and growth. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) argue that more
household credit leads to lower private savings and so slower economic growth. Beck et al. (2012) show
that credit to households (most of which is mortgages, in most economies) has negligible growth effects.
Earlier, Xu (2000) had identified business investment, not household spending, as the channel through
which financial development affects growth. Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) and Büyükkarabacak and
Krause (2009) find that countries with more household credit have higher probabilities of crisis and weaker
external balances. Jappelli et al. (2008), Barba and Pivetti (2009) and Sutherland et al. (2012) find positive
crisis and recession effects of the expansion of household credit, respectively. Mian and Sufi (2014) show
the close relationship between the severity of a recession and the build-up of household debt that preceded
it. In the present paper we go beyond this: we find a negative growth coefficient on average, not just during
recessions.
We find that the growth coefficient of total bank credit stocks, traditionally used to measure financial
development, was insignificant or negative in fixed-effect panel regressions over the sample period - also
before the 2008 crisis and also when controlling for the level of credit-to-GDP ratios, for institutions, and for
financial crises. In GMM estimations, this appears to be due primarily to the negative growth coefficient
for credit to asset markets, predominantly household mortgages. These findings hold up in regressions
with Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s methodology, and in a battery of robustness checks. The negative growth
coefficient of mortgage credit - and of bank credit to asset markets generally - helps clarify why financial
development was not good for growth in our 1990-2011 sample.
While this is our main contribution, we augment the analysis with the distinction between stocks and
flows of credit (Biggs et al., 2010). The rationale for this distinction is that credit flows are a stimulus to
growth due to more spending, different from the traditional reallocation effect of more financial develop-
5
ment. Credit flows increase agents’ ability to finance expenditures. This is a direct short-term ‘liquidity
effect’ on output, since “[l]oans cause deposits and those deposits cause an expansion of transactions” (Ca-
porale and Howells, 2001; Borio and Lowe, 2004, p. 555). This ’expansion of transactions’ will be GDP
growth insofar transactions of goods and services (not of assets) are involved. Without this distinction, we
might overestimate financial development effects, which are credit stock effects.
This stock-flow distinction is new to the empirical credit-growth literature, but there is a clear parallel
in the fiscal macro literature. Flows of government deficit spending may boost growth in the short term,
but by simultaneously raising stocks of public debt they may decrease longer term growth. The (positive)
impact of deficits differs from the (negative) impact of debt. What goes for public debt, goes for private
debt. We therefore analyze credit stocks and credit flows separately. We find more negative growth effects
of financial development (measured by credit stocks scaled by GDP) when controlling for the positive effect
of credit flows.4 Note that our main argument does not depend on the stock-flow distinction.
Our paper provides evidence for the argument made in Bezemer (2014) that the empirical credit-growth
literature inspired by Schumpeter (starting with King and Levine (1993)) needs to take differentiation of
credit into account. A “[d]istinction between debts according to purpose, however difficult to carry out”,
as Schumpeter (1939, p. 148) wrote, may help understand changes in the growth-effectiveness of credit. In
the next section we present the new data. Sections 3 and 4 present the methodology and empirical findings.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary, discussion and conclusion.
2. Data
We collected data from the consolidated balance sheets of monetary financial institutions in central
bank sources, for 46 countries over 1990-2011. On the asset side of the balance sheet, loans to nonbanks
are reported separately as mortgages to households, household consumption credit, credit to nonfinancial
business, and credit to financial business (insurance, pension funds, and other nonbank financial firms).5
To the best of our knowledge, no data with similar detail has been collected and reported before.6 In the
Data Appendix we report sources and compare our data to other data sets. In this section we introduce
definitions for the key variables in the analysis: stocks and flows of credit categories. We discuss their
development over time and across countries.
4We follow the traditional measure for credit stocks, which is the summation of current and past credit flows (equation (1) below).
Therefore the growth coefficient for credit stocks includes the growth effect of current credit flows. In the analysis we will account for
this effect by including credit flows as a separate variable.
5A fifth category is bank lending to government, which is however often not reported and in any case mostly small.
6Related data sets are in Beck et al. (2012) (which ends in 2005 and does not have 15 countries included in our data) and BIS (2013)
which include both bonds and bank credit and does not differentiate bank credit. We refer to the Data Appendix for a comparative
discussion.
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2.1. Definitions and Trends
We define credit stocks as the credit-to-GDP ratio:
si,t =
Ci,t
GDPi,t
(1)
where i denotes country, t denotes time and C is a credit measure. We measure credit flows by the annual
change of credit stocks relative to lagged GDP, as follows (Biggs et al., 2010):
fi,t =
Ci,t − Ci,t−1
GDPi,t−1
(2)
We aggregate the four types of credit into two broader categories: ’nonfinancial’ credit (credit to non-
financial business plus household consumption loans) and ’asset market’ credit (mortgages plus credit to
financial business). The latter follows the ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ sectors classification of the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.7
Three features stand out in the 1990-2011 data: the expansion of credit relative to GDP over time (Figure
2), the changing composition of credit stocks (Figure 3), and the correlation of stocks and flows of credit
categories with economic growth (Figure 4). Figure (2a) shows that for a balanced panel of 14 countries
in our data - selected on data availability -, on average the total-credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 75%
to 120% over 1990-2011. Although the finance-growth relation differs between developed and emerging
economies (Rioja and Valev, 2004), we observe that the increase is pronounced in both country groupings.
Figure (2b) shows the trends for 5 selected developed economies. In Spain, the credit-to-GDP ratio rose
over 1992-2011 from 118% in 1992 to 389% at the time of the 2008 financial crisis. The increases are also
pronounced in the Netherlands, from 77% to 210%; in Greece, from 33% to 115%; and in the UK, from 39%
to 90% over the 1990-2011 period. Figure (2c) for emerging economies shows that here much of the increase
in the credit-to-GDP ratio occurred in the 2000s. In Croatia for instance, the credit-to-GDP ratio increased
from 55% in 2001 to 150% in 2011. Declines were rare and often associated with episodes of financial crisis.
The average of country credit ratios peaked and then declined slightly after the 2008 financial crisis.
7Three notes are in order. First, the present paper differs from other studies which distinguish between credit into ‘enterprise’ and
‘household’ credit (Beck et al., 2012; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010; Büyükkarabacak and Krause, 2009). In practice the difference
is not a large one on average as credit stocks to financial business and household consumption credit are both relatively small.
Second, we aggregated into two categories for reasons of parsimony in presentation; alternative aggregations are possible but do not
qualitatively affect our results. For robustness purposes, we also analyze growth effects of all four types of credit below. We will
find that the decisive distinction is between household mortgages and nonfinancial business credit.Third, while this delineation is
useful, its measurement is necessarily imprecise. For instance, mortgage credit often also serves as consumer credit through home
equity withdrawals, while business credit includes business mortgage credit. Conversely, nonfinancial businesses realize part of their
returns in trading financial assets (see e.g. Krippner, 2005 on the U.S.)
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Figure 2: Developments of bank credit stocks
(a) Total bank credit stocks over 1990-2011
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Note: Panel (2a) plots the unweighted average based on authors’ own calculations for a balanced panel of 14 countries, namely
Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Germany, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore
and United States.
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A second trend is the changing composition of credit. Table A.1 in the Data Appendix shows that on
average, lending to nonfinancial business and household mortgage lending are the two principal credit
categories. Figure (3a) shows that most of the growth in the credit-GDP ratio is due to growth of credit
to asset markets, especially mortgage credit (bank credit to nonbank financials is small in these data). The
ratio of nonfinancial credit to GDP is roughly stable over time around 40%. We study the shifting credit
composition in more detail. Figure (3b) first illustrates that the share of nonfinancial credit in total credit
varies considerably across countries. It appears to be negatively correlated to income levels. Figure (3c)
shows the shift in credit composition over time. The vertical distance to the diagonal measures a country’s
shift in the share of nonfinancial credit in total credit between its first and last observation. The share was
nondeclining in 10 countries, positive in one and falling in all others.
A third observation is on the credit-growth relation, for stocks and flows of credit. Table 1 presents
the growth correlations of stocks and flows of the two credit aggregates and the four categories of credit.
There appears to be a robustly negative cross-section relation over 1990-2011 of credit stocks relative to
GDP with real per capita GDP growth, though with significant scatter and possible nonlinearity around
the trend line (Figure (4a)). There also appears to be a positive correlation over time of per capita output
growth with total-credit flows (Figure (4b)). Panel A in Table 1 shows that the negative correlation of
credit stocks with growth is mainly driven by mortgages and (to a lesser extent) financial-sector credit. The
correlation of growth with credit to all asset markets is less negative and less significant. Panel B further
shows that flows of nonfinancial credit have the highest correlation with growth, closely followed by its
two components, nonfinancial business credit and household consumption loans. Growth correlations of
credit flows to financial business and household mortgage credit flows are much smaller. We also note the
large correlations of total credit stocks with mortgage credit stocks.
3. Empirical Strategy
We regress real GDP per capita growth on annual stocks and flows of total credit and of the two credit
aggregates, controlling for other determinants of growth. Given the short time span of our sample, we
use 3-year averages of the underlying annual data to iron out business cycle fluctuations.8 We start with a
8We also computed results with the more common 5-year intervals, which are available on request. We estimated FE and system
GMM models and for the latter we use two lags of the endogenous variables as internal instruments. The loss of observations
compared to using 3-year periods is large, e.g. from 237 to 143 observations in the first specification (column (1) in Table 3). Still, we
are able to replicate the qualitative findings. In some cases the results have stronger significance, in other cases they weaken; but the
signs of coefficients are never the opposite of what we report here.
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Figure 3: Developments in credit composition
(a) Different types of bank credit stocks over 1990-2011
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(c) The dynamics of credit composition over time
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Figure 4: Credit stocks, credit flows and economic growth over 1990-2011
(a) Credit stocks and growth
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Table 1: Credit stocks, credit flows and growth: correlations
GDP p.c. Total Nonfinancial Financial Non-financial Consumer Mortgage Fin. Bus.
growth credit sector sector credit credit credit credit
Panel A: Stocks
GDP p.c. growth 1
Total credit -0.324*** 1
Nonfinancial credit (a+b) -0.282*** 0.827*** 1
Asset market credit (c+d) -0.287*** 0.917*** 0.535*** 1
a. Nonfinancial business -0.275*** 0.786*** 0.965*** 0.497*** 1
b. Consumption -0.190* 0.622*** 0.710*** 0.432*** 0.502*** 1
c. Mortgage -0.312*** 0.903*** 0.606*** 0.928*** 0.543*** 0.542*** 1
d. Financial business -0.147 0.626*** 0.231** 0.777*** 0.248** 0.097 0.488*** 1
Panel B: Flows
GDP p.c. growth 1
Total credit 0.27*** 1
Nonfinancial credit (a+b) 0.313*** 0.802*** 1
Asset market credit (c+d) 0.147 0.856*** 0.377*** 1
a. Nonfinancial business 0.273*** 0.782*** 0.952*** 0.373*** 1
b. Consumption 0.282 0.440*** 0.568*** 0.19* 0.35*** 1
c. Mortgage 0.104 0.748*** 0.384*** 0.826*** 0.356*** 0.274*** 1
d. Financial business 0.131 0.605*** 0.203* 0.761*** 0.228** 0.01 0.263*** 1
Note: This table reports pairwise correlation coefficients between growth and different types of credit stocks and flows, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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baseline fixed-effect panel data baseline model over 1990-2011 for 46 countries. Then we estimate system-
GMM and difference-in-difference models to account for endogeneity. The baseline specification is:
gi,t = α + β1si,t + β2 fi,t + γXi,t + ϕi + φt + ei,t (3)
where gi,t is the growth rate of real GDP per capita (2000 constant US dollar) of country i in three-year
period t; Coefficients β1 and β2 capture the relations of credit stocks (si,t), and credit flows ( fi,t) with growth,
respectively, where we will estimate a total-credit measure, ‘nonfinancial’ credit and ‘asset market’ credit
separately. Xit is a vector of control variables, including the level of real GDP per capita at the beginning
of t, trade openness (imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP), government expenditure as a share
of GDP, inflation, education (average years of schooling of the adult population) and a composite country
risk indicator as a proxy for institutional quality, ranging from 50 (low institutional quality) to 100 (high
institutional quality). We include unobserved country-specific time-invariant effects in ϕi, time dummies φt
and a white-noise error term with mean zero ei,t. In robustness checks we will also include an interaction
term of credit flows with credit stocks and a systematic banking crises indicator (Laeven and Valencia,
2013). 9 Table 2 summarizes definitions, sources and descriptive statistics.
Since financial development may be endogenous to growth, we also estimate a generalized-method-of-
moments (GMM) dynamic panel model.10 We difference (3) to obtain:
4gi,t = β14si,t + β24 fi,t + γ4Xi,t +4φt +4ei,t (4)
and then estimate equations (3) and (4) using system-GMM estimation. The endogenous credit variables
are now instrumented by their lags in equation (4). We use lagged differences as instruments for the levels
equation (3) and lagged variables in levels as instruments for the differenced equation (4).11 The consis-
tency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of instruments and on the validity of the assumption
that the error term, ei,t, does not exhibit serial correlation. We apply Hansen test for over-identifying restric-
tions, testing for the overall validity of the instruments, along with a test for second order serial correlation
of the residuals.
Third, we will also use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) industry-level methodology to account for the
endogeneity of credit to growth.12 In contrast to past studies based on cross sectional data (including
9All country-level variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, except education (which is retrieved from the
Barro and Lee (2013) database) and institutional quality, extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.
10See Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM specification combines regressions in levels and in
differences, yielding unbiased estimators for the coefficients of interest.
11In all specifications, two or three lags are used as instruments. In all cases, the number of instruments is smaller than the number
of countries.
12Rajan and Zingales (1998) utilize an industry-specific index of external financial dependence, defined as capital expenditures
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (3-year averaged data)
Variable Source Unit Obs Mean Std Min Max
Credit Stocks
Total credit Own Calculation % of GDP 237 82.174 50.941 9.82 381.584
Credit aggregates
Nonfinancial credit Own Calculation % of GDP 237 45.135 25.504 5.944 187.026
Asset market credit Own Calculation % of GDP 228 38.501 32.206 0.245 194.559
Credit categories
Nonfinancial business Own Calculation % of GDP 237 35.594 18.226 5.565 92.696
Consumption Own Calculation % of GDP 206 10.976 12.458 0.221 94.33
Mortgage Own Calculation % of GDP 228 30.273 27.386 0.245 194.559
Financial business Own Calculation % of GDP 191 9.822 12.302 0.058 76.323
Credit Flows
Total credit Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 228 7.406 7.517 -4.335 70.305
Credit aggregates
Nonfinancial credit Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 228 3.74 4.239 -4.612 32.055
Asset market credit Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 219 3.816 4.44 -2.931 38.249
Credit categories
Nonfinancial business Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 228 2.801 3.217 -4.771 16.767
Consumption Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 199 1.075 1.779 -1.803 15.288
Mortgage Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 219 2.976 3.617 -2.825 38.249
Financial business Own Calculation % of lagged GDP 183 1.006 2.327 -2.621 21.978
Other Variables
GDP per capita growth WDI Percentage points 237 2.306 2.475 -7.602 12.629
Initial GDP per capita WDI In log 237 9.323 1.095 6.142 10.913
Trade openness WDI % of GDP 237 94.554 76.798 15.546 424.013
Government size WDI % of GDP 237 17.81 4.805 7.197 28.413
Inflation WDI Percentage points 237 4.431 6.679 -3.123 66.008
Education Barro and Lee (2012) Years 237 9.553 2.202 3.472 13.262
Institution ICRG Index 237 78.433 6.992 60.867 92.067
Crisis Laeven and Valencia (2012) Dummy variable 237 0.11 0.313 0 1
Note: ’Total credit’ was computed only for country-year observations where there was at least one nonzero observation for
nonfinancial credit and one observation for asset market credit.
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Rajan and Zingales, 1998), we use panel data. Our approach has two distinctive features compared to
similar analyses. First, we are able to control for a wider range of industry-time and industry-country fixed
effects. This alleviates omitted variables bias. Second, by including the credit variable itself, in addition to
its interaction with financial dependence, our specification allows for an assessment of the direct effect of
credit on industry-level growth. Our specification is:
growthj,i,t = θ0sharej,i,t0 + θ1si,t + θ2si,t× EDj + θ3 fi,t + θ4 fi,t× EDj + +µj + ϕi +φt + δj,t + ηj,i +γXi,ts + ej,i,t
(5)
where j denotes industry, i denotes country and t denotes time (i.e., a 3-year period). This specification
is closely related to Braun and Larrain (2005); growth is measured as the annual percentage change of
industry real value added.13 Share is defined as the size of each industry as a percentage of manufacturing
value added at the beginning of each 3-year period. Similar to our country-level specifications above, s
and f denote the stocks and flows of credit categories. ED is the external financial dependence indicator,
taken from Rajan and Zingales (1998). We include a series of dummy variables to control for industry-
(µj), country- (ϕi), time- (φt), industry-time (δj,t) and industry-country (ηj,i) fixed effects. We include the
same vector of control variables Xi,t as in equation (9) and (10), which vary at the country-time dimension.
Finally, ej,i,t is an error term.
Our industry-level analysis covers an unbalanced panel of 36 ISIC three- and four-digit manufacturing
industries for 41 countries during 1990-2011 from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT4). We ensure that the number of industries available through time
is constant across each individual country, while the number of industries across countries may vary. Table
A.4 in the Data Appendix lists the 41 countries and the availability of industry coverage. Table A.5 lists 36
industries, ISIC code and the value of external financial dependence per industry.
minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. They rank industries by the median (U.S. Compustat) firm’s
external dependence on finance and observe that industries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries with
more developed financial systems, measured as the credit-to-GDP ratio. By exploiting cross-industry variations while controlling
for a range of country-specific and industry-specific factors, this widely used methodology alleviates endogeneity concerns. Other
studies support this approach. Using European micro-level data for 1996-2005, Bena and Ondko (2012) show that firms in industries
with growth opportunities use more external finance in more financially developed countries. This result is particularly significant
for firms that are more likely to be financially constrained and dependent on domestic financial markets, such as small and young
firms. Kroszner et al. (2007) use a similar approach to show that sectors highly dependent on external finance experience a greater
contraction during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems. Raddatz (2006) shows that sectors with larger liquidity
needs are more volatile and experience deeper crises in financially underdeveloped countries.
13As the industry-specific deflators are not available across a large number of countries, we choose to deflate industry nominal
value added by the country-specific consumer price index (CPI), as in Braun and Larrain (2005). Albeit imperfect, this provides a
good approximation for a wide range of countries in our sample.
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It is worth noting that our industry-level methodology presupposes that the dependence on external
finance is sufficiently constant over time that the industry ranking does not change. In defense of this
assumption, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue (but do not test) that external dependence on finance reflects
technological factors of an industry, such as project scale, gestation and cash harvest period, and the need
for continual investment. These industry-inherent characteristics are likely to be persistent over time. In
support, Kroszner et al. (2007) report a correlation of 0.82 between the external dependence index for the
period 1980-1999 measure and the original Rajan-Zingales measure for 1980-1989. Haltenhof et al. (2014)
also find remarkable stability of the external dependence measures over the 1980s, 1980-1997 and 1990-
2011. The latter period supports the use of 1980s values in our 1990-2011 sample.
A more problematic assumption may be that the US-based measure of external dependence is a valid
proxy for the same industries across countries. Furstenberg and Kalckreuth (2006) show that even in the US,
the measure for financing conditions in manufacturing industries changes when using an alternative source
of industry data. Furthermore, they find that the presumed correlations between external dependence and
a number of structural/technological industry characteristics, are in fact weak. Nevertheless, Kroszner
et al. (2007) provide some empirical validation of this assumption. They find that their results are robust
when using other countries (Canada and non-crisis countries) as the benchmark, instead of the U.S. In view
of these caveats, we present the Rajan-Zingales results as additional rather than conclusive evidence.
4. Estimation Results
In this section we present estimation results for stocks and flows of a total-credit measure and of credit
aggregates. We then proceed with a variety of robustness checks and a discussion of our findings.
4.1. Credit stocks, credit flows and their growth effects
Table 3 presents the results of the fixed-effect panel baseline model (columns 1-3) and the system-GMM
model (columns 4-6). Results for credit stocks are in columns (1) and (4), results for credit flows in column
(2) and (5). Credit stocks, the common measure for financial development, have no significant positive
correlation to growth, in line with other studies (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Stengos et al., 2007; Valick-
ova et al., 2013). We go beyond this observation in columns (3) and (6), where both stocks and flows are
included. We observe negative (but weakly significant) growth effects of credit/GDP stocks. That is, con-
trolling for the positive effect of credit flows, financial development appears bad for growth. Credit-growth
studies which do not control for the positive effect of credit flows will tend to overestimate the stock effect,
which represents financial development. But even without controlling for flows (i.e. adopting the common
methodology in the credit-growth literature), the growth effect of financial deepening was insignificantly
different from zero over 1990-2011.
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Table 3: Credit and Economic Growth: Stock and Flow Effects
FE System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Credit
Credit stocks -0.008 -0.013* -0.02 -0.016**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Credit flows 0.055 0.067 0.085 0.071
(0.040) (0.043) (0.057) (0.054)
Initial GDPPC -5.632* -7.132** -6.210** -2.618** -3.071*** -2.271***
(2.954) (2.750) (2.974) (1.122) (1.055) (0.808)
Trade 0.012 0.014* 0.011 0.007** 0.006* 0.006**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Government -0.374** -0.361** -0.295 0.008 0.012 -0.004
(0.163) (0.171) (0.182) (0.050) (0.060) (0.046)
Inflation -0.102 -0.112 -0.105 -0.112 -0.114 -0.113
(0.097) (0.099) (0.098) (0.094) (0.088) (0.087)
Education 0.54 0.42 0.455 0.249 0.293* 0.199
(0.515) (0.477) (0.485) (0.178) (0.167) (0.131)
Institutions 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.167*** 0.259** 0.225** 0.200***
(0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.108) (0.104) (0.073)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 237 228 228 237 228 228
Number of id 46 46 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.484 0.505 0.517
AR(2) 0.485 0.651 0.617
Overidentification 0.403 0.383 0.346
Note: This table presents the results using total credit based on equations (3) and
(4). Columns (1)-(3) present the FE results, columns (4)-(6) show the system-GMM re-
sults. The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (con-
stant 2005 US dollar) over each 3-year period. Credit stocks and flows are defined
as in equations (1) and (2). Initial GDPPC is real GDP per capita at the beginning
of each 3-year period. Trade is imports plus exports, divided by GDP. Government
is government consumption divided by GDP. Inflation is the change in CPI. Educa-
tion is average years of schooling. Institutions is the ICRG composite country risk
measure. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test (we report the p-value);
Over-identification is the Hansen J statistic (we report the p-value). All specifications
include time dummies (coefficients not reported). Coefficients for the constant are not
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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We proceed to distinguish ‘nonfinancial’ from ‘asset market’ credit. Table 4 reports baseline model
results in columns (1)-(6) and the corresponding system GMM results in columns (7)-(12), with identical
coefficient signs as in the baseline panel results. In all specifications, the validity of the instruments and the
absence of second-order autocorrelation is not rejected.
We find that stocks of both credit aggregates correlate negatively to growth. It is striking that the coeffi-
cient for nonfinancial credit stocks is significantly negative in the FE specifications but no longer significant
in the system-GMM models. Conversely, the coefficient for asset market credit is negative and significant
in the system-GMM specification only. While it is hazardous to attach firm conclusions to the change in
statistical significance, this pattern would be consistent with a negative effect of asset market credit after
controlling for endogeneity, but not for credit to nonfinancial business after controlling for endogeneity.
This begs the question what endogeneity problems would be consistent with this pattern?14 An important
endogeneity highlighted in the credit-growth literature is reverse causality from growth to credit. We ten-
tatively suggest the following interpretation. Stocks of asset market credit such as mortgages accumulate
in response to income growth (a positive correlation due to reverse causation). But they are also a burden
to growth due to a combination of repayment, consumption and debt overhang effects (a negative correla-
tion). This combination of positive and negative effects may produce the insignificant estimates in the FE
specification, but correcting for the reverse causality underlying the positive effect, we obtain significantly
negative GMM coefficients. Further, it is plausible that nonfinancial business borrowing responds less
strongly to GDP growth than does asset market investment, and that nonfinancial business investments
supported by bank credit produce growth effects which are larger and more persistent than the asset price
increases that credit to asset markets causes. If we accept these two assumptions, then the positive reverse
causality effect is weaker for credit to nonfinancial business (leading to on balance negative FE estimates)
while the positive ’true’ credit-growth effect is stronger (leading to on balance insignificant GMM effects).
We emphasize that this interpretation is tentative and subject to further research.
In column (12), a one standard deviation increase in the stock of asset-market credit corresponds to
0.74 standard deviation decrease in the growth rate, which is equal to a 1.83 percentage points decrease in
growth in this sample.15 Considering that the average growth rate in our sample is 2.3 percentage points,
the effect is large. The result in column (9) implies that a one standard deviation increase in nonfinancial
credit flows is associated with a 0.32 standard deviation increase in growth, which is equal to an additional
0.79 percentage point increase in growth in this sample.16 Overall, the results suggest that controlling for
14We thank an anonymous referee for asking the question.
15The calculation is: (-0.057*32.2)/2.475=0.74. 32.2 and 2.475 are one standard deviation of asset-market credit stocks and one
standard deviation of the output growth rate, respectively.
16The calculation is 0.189*4.24/2.475=0.32, where 4.24 and 2.475 are one standard deviation of nonfinancial credit flows and output
growth rate, respectively.
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endogeneity, the growth effect of financial deepening of asset markets, as measured by credit stocks, was
negative.
4.2. Industry-level evidence
Estimation results applying the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology are shown in Table 5. The ‘external
dependence on finance’ variable is defined as the annual excess of investment over profit, i.e. the annual
flow of bank credit and other borrowing to finance investment. Thus, it captures ability to access external
finance. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for total credit, columns (4)-(6) and columns (7)-(9) report results
for nonfinancial credit and credit to asset markets, respectively. The results are in line with the panel
data estimations. We find that the coefficient for credit stocks is again consistently negative, with more
significant coefficients for credit to asset markets. The positive coefficients for the interaction of credit
stocks and financial dependence suggest that firms in industries which are better able to access external
finance, experience smaller growth-retarding effects from debt stocks. In line with this, the coefficient
for nonfinancial credit flows is positive. Coefficients for flows of (mostly) household mortgage credit are
insignificantly different from zero - which is unsurprising in this industry-level analysis. The bottom panel
of Table 5 reports marginal effects. The implied growth difference between high ED and low ED industries
is 3 to 4 percentage points growth.
4.3. Interacting credit stocks and flows
So far, we treated the growth effects of credit stocks and flows independently, as if the effect of obtaining
new loans is independent of debt levels. One can think of a number of plausible mechanisms linking
both, in most cases weakening the positive growth effect of credit flows at higher levels of credit stocks
(Stockhammer, 2004; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). Not accounting for these effects might partly drive
our results through omitted-variable bias. We therefore introduce an interaction term of credit flows with
stocks (i.e., with financial development). Table 6 reports the results. We find a negative interaction effect
between credit stocks and credit flows for nonfinancial credit and for total credit, with weak significance.
At higher levels of financial development (credit stocks), the growth effect of credit flows is indeed smaller.
Possible interpretations include diminishing returns to credit and a balance sheet effect of debt.
4.4. Robustness tests
We run a number of robustness checks. Table 7 summarizes the findings. Due to space limitations, we do
not include full regression tables, which are available on request. We first explore how the results change
when we replace the two credit aggregates with their components. This is motivated by the concern that the
aggregates might be hiding heterogeneity in the credit-growth relations of their underlying components.
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Table 5: Credit and Economic Growth: Industry-Level Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total credit Nonfinancial credit Asset market credit
Credit stocks -0.030** -0.044*** -0.034 -0.064** -0.069*** -0.084***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024)
ED*credit stocks 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.089** 0.099** 0.095*** 0.094**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) (0.036) (0.040)
Credit flows 0.134** 0.175*** 0.387*** 0.429*** 0.067 0.154*
(0.053) (0.056) (0.121) (0.124) (0.077) (0.089)
ED*credit flows 0.016 -0.021 -0.007 -0.062 0.056 -0.022
(0.090) (0.095) (0.186) (0.192) (0.154) (0.164)
Initial share 0.473* 0.543** 0.539** 0.474* 0.537** 0.534** 0.234 0.303 0.3
(0.260) (0.261) (0.261) (0.259) (0.260) (0.260) (0.226) (0.226) (0.228)
Observations 5,415 5,182 5,182 5,415 5,182 5,182 5,306 5,073 5,073
Number of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.447 0.457 0.459 0.446 0.459 0.46 0.417 0.425 0.427
Marginal Effects of credit stocks
for high dependence industry -0.006 -0.019 0.007 -0.018 -0.025 -0.041
for low dependence industry -0.026 -0.039 -0.027 -0.056 -0.061 -0.076
Implied differential effect 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.038 0.036 0.035
Note: This table presents the industry-level evidence based on equation (5). Columns (1)-(3) presents the results for total credit,
columns (4)-(6) for ‘nonfinancial credit’ (the sum of nonfinancial business and consumption credit) and columns (7)-(9) for ‘asset
market credit’ (the sum of financial business and mortgage credit). The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real
value added over each 3-year period. Credit stocks and flows are defined as in equations (1 ) and (2). ED is external dependence
on finance, taken from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Initial share is the share of each industry in a country’s s total manufacturing
value added at the beginning of each 3-year period. All estimations include a constant and country, year, industry, industry-year
and industry-country dummies (coefficients not reported). Country-time controls include initial GDP per capita at the beginning
of each 3-year period, trade openness, government spending, inflation, education and institution, as in the country-level regres-
sionsin table 4. The last three rows show the marginal growth effect of credit stocks for an industry in the 75th percentile and an
industry in the 25th percentile in the external finance dependence index. The difference between these two is the implied differ-
ential effect. All standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for industry-country level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Credit and Economic Growth: Stock and Flow Interaction Effects
FE System-GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total credit Nonfinancial Asset market Total credit Nonfinancial Asset market
Credit stocks -0.005 -0.028 0.012 0.01 0.011 0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.021)
Credit flows 0.184*** 0.299*** 0.304*** 0.141 0.239* 0.124
(0.041) (0.070) (0.085) (0.085) (0.131) (0.242)
Stocks * flows -0.001*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.0002 -0.001* -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.002)
Initial GDPPC -6.787** -5.089 -8.049*** -4.124** -3.817*** -2.938**
(2.850) (3.232) (2.678) (1.624) (1.417) (1.233)
Trade 0.013 0.009 0.020** 0.006 0.006 0.006**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Government -0.256 -0.26 -0.348* 0.045 0.048 0.007
(0.177) (0.176) (0.178) (0.083) (0.081) (0.055)
Inflation -0.114 -0.117 -0.122 -0.127 -0.131 -0.111
(0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.102) (0.102) (0.093)
Education 0.499 0.648 0.155 0.402 0.393* 0.231
(0.453) (0.493) (0.385) (0.248) (0.226) (0.177)
Institutions 0.157*** 0.146** 0.180*** 0.304** 0.311** 0.198*
(0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.149) (0.129) (0.099)
Observations 228 228 219 228 228 219
Number of id 46 46 44 46 46 44
R-squared 0.548 0.548 0.552
AR(2) 0.979 0.962 0.892
Overidentification 0.288 0.483 0.415
Note: This table reports results including the interactions of credit stocks and flows. Columns (1) and (4) use
total credit, whereas columns (2), (5) and (3), (6) use ‘nonfinancial credit’ (the sum of nonfinancial business and
consumption credit) and ‘asset market credit’ (the sum of financial business and mortgage credit), respectively.
Columns (1)-(3) present the FE results, columns (4)-(6) show the system-GMM results. The dependent variable is
the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2005 US dollar) over each 3-year period. Credit stocks
and flows are defined as in equations (1) and (2). Initial GDPPC is the real GDP per capita at the beginning of each
3-year period. Trade is imports plus exports, divided by GDP. Government is government consumption divided
by GDP. Inflation is the change in CPI. Education is average years of schooling. Institutions is the ICRG composite
country risk measure. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test (p-value is reported); Over-identification
is the Hansen J statistic (p-value is reported). All specifications include constants and time dummies (coefficients
are not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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We report fixed-effect results for each of the four underlying credit categories in columns (1a)-(4a) and
system-GMM results in columns (1b)-(4b). We find that the negative relations between credit stocks and
growth holds overall but is particularly strong for non-financial business credit (column (1a)) and mortgage
credit (column (3b)). This is unsurprising since they constitute the bulk of their respective aggregates. None
of the four components have coefficients with an opposite sign to their aggregate. This suggests that the
stock aggregates do not hide significant heterogeneity in the underlying credit-growth relations. Credit
flows to non-financial business are positively related to growth. Coefficients for flows of mortgage and
consumer credit are both insignificant in the system-GMM results.
Further, a potential bias may arise from the equal treatment of countries with high and low levels of
credit stocks, if the relation between credit and growth is nonlinear over credit stocks. First, we check
whether our results are driven by countries with high credit stocks but low growth (Denmark, Spain and
Switzerland) or low credit levels but high growth (Armenia, India and Uruguay). We drop these six coun-
tries and report results for ‘nonfinancial credit’ and ‘asset market credit’ in columns (5a)-(6a) and columns
(5b)-(6b). Second, we test whether the results are similar in countries with high and low levels of credit
stocks. We construct two sub-samples based on the distribution of the average credit stocks per country,
one excluding countries in the lowest quantile (a ‘high-credit-stocks’ subsample), and the other exclud-
ing the highest quantile (a ‘low-credit-stocks’ subsample). Results are shown in columns (7a)-(10a) and
(7b)-(10b). In both analyses, our results do not qualitatively change.
Moreover, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) find that the positive relationship that was estimated using
the data from the 1960s to the 1980s disappeared over the subsequent 15 years as a result of the increased
incidence of crises. Other papers show that the link between credit and growth varies over the business
cycle (Braun and Larrain, 2005; Borio, 2014; Jordà et al., 2013). The concern may then be that our results are
driven by the extraordinary 2008-2011 years. To explore this, we construct a new sample by excluding the
post-2007 observations and re-estimate both our specifications in columns (11a)-(12a) and (11b)-(12b). The
results are consistent with our longer sample.
We also address Rousseau and Wachtel (2011)’s argument by including the Laeven and Valencia (2013)
systematic banking crises variable. We characterize a 3-year country observation as a crisis episode if the
country was in crisis for at least one year during this period.17 Of the 46 countries in our sample, 20
experienced at least one crisis episode. We introduce an interaction term between credit stocks and crisis
episodes, controlling for any independent effect of crises on growth. The results in columns (13a)-(14a) and
(13b)-(14b) show that the coefficient for nonfinancial credit stocks is significant and negative in the fixed
effect estimation, the coefficient for asset market credit is significant and negative in the GMM estimation,
17Alternatively, we characterize a 3 year episode as crisis if the country was in crisis for at least two years during a three-year
period. Our results are quantitatively similar.
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just as in Table 4. Our results are not driven by country-specific banking crisis.
5. Summary and Conclusion
Financial deepening is a double-edged sword. It supports investments and increases the economy’s ca-
pacity to reallocate factors of production. But a large credit-to-GDP ratio may be a drag on growth. It
may imply high levels of private debt, reduce investment and innovation, and induce volatility, financial
fragility and crisis. We show that credit to real estate and other asset markets tends to increase the credit-to-
GDP ratio while stocks of credit to nonfinancial business rise roughly in line with GDP. In recent decades,
a shift in the composition of credit towards real estate and other asset markets has therefore coincided with
rising credit-to-GDP ratios. It may have diminished the growth effectiveness of credit.
To test this conjecture, we present and analyze new, hand-collected data for 46 economies over 1990-
2011. We document and explore trends in credit categories. We find that the growth coefficient of different
credit stocks scaled by GDP is insignificant or negative, especially credit stocks supporting asset markets.
We observe insignificant or negative correlations of credit stocks with output growth. This holds up in
fixed-effect panel data regressions, dynamic panel estimations (system-GMM models), in regressions with
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, and in robustness checks. These results are confirmed in an
industry-level difference-in-difference analysis. The positive effect of credit flows diminishes at higher
levels of financial development.
These results are in line with declined growth effectiveness of financial development as a result of a
change in the use of bank credit. Bank credit has shifted away from nonfinancial business towards asset
markets, where it has no or small growth effects. This shift towards more credit to asset markets also
implies faster growth of credit stocks relative to GDP, which may be harmful in itself.
A clear limitation of our study is the short time sample, which is dictated by data availability. We
would also like to see a better disaggregation of credit, for instance between business mortgages and other
business credit. Given the recent crises in commercial real estate markets in several economies, this would
seem a relevant distinction. Researchers depend here on the quality and detail of the data provided by
central banks. Another limitation is the use of country-level data. In future research, the effect of bank loan
portfolios on output growth could be examined in matched bank-firm data. Recent studies in this vein
show promising results (e.g. Jiminez et al., 2014). The use of microlevel data also opens up new avenues
for dealing with endogeneity problems.
In summary, our new data and analysis suggest that what was true in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s when
the field of empirical credit-growth studies blossomed, is no longer true in the 1990s and 2000s. Banks do
not primarily lend to nonfinancial business and financial development may no longer be good for growth.
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These trends predate the 2008 crisis. They prompt a rethink of the role of banks in the process of economic
growth.
Our findings are consistent with broader concerns with a world which has too much rather than too
little financial development. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) conclude that “there is a pressing need to re-
assess the relationship of finance and real growth in modern economic systems. More finance is definitely
not always better.”. Piketty (2014) suggests that a large ratio of capital to income may depress growth,
where capital is the sum of financial and fixed capital. His empirical work shows that most of the increase
in the capital-income ratio is due to the increase in the value of financial assets. In our data, we observe
large increases in bank lending supporting asset markets and insignificant or negative growth correlations
of these credit stocks. Mian and Sufi (2014) emphasize the role of household leverage in a consumption
slowdown in high-debt economies. Summers (2013) suggests that equilibrium real interest rates may have
been declining over the last decades, possibly to negative values. In these views, more financial develop-
ment leading to more savings, more financial capital, lower interest rates and more debt may not stimulate
growth. Our estimates show that even though credit flows may constitute a stimulus to growth, credit
stocks - the traditional measure for financial development - have negative or insignificant growth coeffi-
cients.
The common theme between these analyses and our paper appears to be that there are costs to having an
economy and a financial system increasingly geared towards growing markets for real estate and financial
assets. This opens up a wide array of research questions. It is not clear that these trends arise because of
growing inequality, as Piketty suggests. It is unclear which of the many reasons suggested by Summers are
relevant to negative real returns. We do not know whether the finance-growth relation we document for
the last two decades is a temporary or secular trend. These are subjects for future research.
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Data Appendix
The aim of the database is to provide a detailed description of monetary financial institutions’ (banks
and credit unions) loan assets where the counterparty is a domestic non-government nonbank. We col-
lected data from the consolidated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions from central bank sources
of 46 countries over 1990-2011. On the asset side of the balance sheet, loans to nonbanks are reported. We
included a country in the data set if loans were reported separately for mortgages to households, house-
hold consumption credit, credit to nonfinancial business, and credit to financial business (insurance firms,
pension funds, and other nonbank financial firms).18
Lending to government by banks is usually a very small paprt of total bank lending. We choose not
to include this in our data. Mortgages in our data are household mortgages, which is only part of total
mortgages. Some countries also report business mortgage lending separately from other lending to busi-
ness, and in these cases it is clear that a substantial part of lending to business is lending secured by real
estate. But the use of secured lending to business will be more linked to production and trade, and thus
GDP, while the use of mortgages to household is almost exclusively to purchase real estate assets. Thus, the
impact on GDP will be different, which suggest that separating out households mortgages is functional,
but separating out business mortgages is less so. Apart from that, it was not practicable to do this. Since
only few countries report business mortgages, we cannot consistently include total mortgages.
Domestic bank credit includes loans by both domestic and foreign banks, in domestic and foreign cur-
rency. For reasons of consistency, it excludes non-bank lending and securitized bank loans. Some countries
have large nonbank debt markets or much securitization, so that loan assets on banks’ balance sheets paint
only a small part of the picture. For one extreme example, this is why ‘total bank credit’ values for the US
are comparatively low: most credit in the US is nonbank credit (bonds and short term paper) and a large
part of loans (especially, mortgages) is securitized so that it cannot be observed on banks’ balance sheets.
The total stock of credit market instruments relative to GDP in the US was 386% in 2011 (BEA flow of fund
data), of which only 34% was bank credit (this data). However, the US is exceptional in this respect.
For each country, the source was always the country’s central bank. There is large diversity in reporting
formats. Only few central banks distinguish deposit taking institutions within the broader category of
Monetary Financial Institutions. Most do not differentiate between lending to public sector firms and
private sector firms, or between domestic currency loans and foreign currency loans. Some central banks
(e.g. Switzerland’s) report credit to ten or fifteen business sectors of the economy separately, which we
18An alternative would be to collect data from the liabilities side of the counterparty, in a country’s flow of fund data. However,
not all countries provide sufficiently detailed flow of funds data on bank loans by sector. What is often reported is total borrowing,
including equity market borrowing while we focus on the analysis of bank credit. Also, to the extent that equity is held in the private
nonfinancial sector, this is a debt from the private nonfinancial sector to the private nonfinancial sector.
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collapsed into ‘financial’ and ‘nonfinancial’. Some report bank lending to nonbanks as well as interbank
lending (which we excluded from the data). Some report only ‘household’ and ‘business’ lending. In
these cases, we assigned household lending to mortgages, unless we had evidence that it was unsecured
consumer lending. Some data go back much before 1990; Switzerland’s goes back to 1977, the US to 1960.
But on average, data before 1990 were rare.
Comparison to Similar Data
Beck et al. (2012) and Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) were the first to study similar data, using a data
set for 73 countries over the years 1994 to 2005. These papers are ground breaking in that they are the first
studies to look at growth effects of different credit aggregates across countries. Our data is not an update of
this, but is newly collected. We aimed to separate out mortgage and other household credit and to observe
each credit category at source. The Beck et al. (2012) data combines mortgage and other household credit
into one household credit category. The data is based on the financial development and structure (FDS)
data base described in Beck et al. (2000) and updated in Beck et al. (2010). Here “private credit” captures the
financial intermediation with the private nonfinancial sector, including mortgages, as explained in note 5 in
Beck et al. (2000) (“claims on real estate (=mortgage credit) is included for nonbanks lending”). In observing
the different credit aggregates, Beck et al. (2012) start with a ‘total credit’ (TC) measure taken from the FDS
data base, which is credit to nonfinancial business (BC) plus credit to households. The ‘household credit’
measure in Beck et al. (2010) and in Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) is defined as (TC-BC), i.e. all non-
business credit, including both consumer credit and mortgage credit. These are not distinguished. The
Beck et al. (2012) credit data are deflated by the CPI deflator and then divided by real (deflated) GDP. Our
data is nominal credit divided by nominal GDP.
Table A2 is a comparison of our data to the Beck et al. (2012) data. We find that the data are mostly in
agreement, except for a few countries. In the Czech Republic, our credit/GDP ratio is about half of those
in the two other data sets. Personal communications with the Czech National Bank suggest that part of the
reason is widespread credit write-downs and therefore data revisions since 2005, a large reduction in the
number of banks, and the inclusion of foreign banks. The same applies to Slovakia, Iceland and Uruqay.
For Sweden, our data yield a credit/GDP ratio which is much higher than in the Beck et al (2012) data,
which is about double the Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) measure. Reclassifications of what counts as
a bank may be behind this. There is also some disparity on the United Kingdom.
A more recent and somewhat comparable data set is the March 2013 Bank of International Settlement
‘Long series on credit to private non-financial sectors’ (BIS, 2013). A description of the data is in Dembier-
mont et al. (2013), including a link to data documentation. In the BIS data, only ‘lending by all sectors’ (i.e.
bank and securities markets) is disaggregated to households and enterprises (except for Brazil, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia and Russia). Bank debt is not disaggregated. This implies on one hand that the BIS data
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provide a more complete picture of all loans to the private sector, while on the other hand they do not in-
clude lending to the nonbank financial sector (which is substantial in some countries). Another limitation
of the BIS data is that by including in one credit measure also nonbank lending (which mostly is lending
through securities markets), it is not possible to study the unique role of bank loans. Since bank debt is not
disaggregated, we cannot directly compare the BIS data to our data.
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Table A.1: Credit stocks across countries (% of GDP)
Country Start End Nonfinancial Consumer Mortgage Financial Total
business Business
ALB 2005 2011 23.468 6.541 32.775 62.784
ARM 2005 2011 11.163 4.069 1.938 0.39 17.17
AUS 1994 2011 34.748 7.462 48.507 8.001 98.718
AUT 1995 2011 47.674 38.202 6.609 92.485
BEL 1999 2011 30.167 5.185 28.032 9.669 73.053
BGR 1998 2011 25.722 6.408 5.261 37.391
BRA 1994 2011 19.671 5.755 2.067 3.887 31.38
CAN 1990 2011 40.139 25.225 43.519 11.652 120.535
CHE 1990 2011 43.161 92.931 1.516 137.608
CHL 1990 2011 43.381 36.427 11.262 91.07
CZE 1997 2011 24.613 5.287 8.591 3.089 41.58
DEU 1990 2011 52.973 10.874 28.532 3.204 95.583
DNK 2000 2011 44.121 25.34 78.656 7.189 155.306
EGY 1991 2011 36.225 7.714 43.939
ESP 1992 2011 59.497 61.904 106.719 228.12
EST 1999 2011 22.55 2.161 20.497 6.496 51.704
FIN 2002 2011 27.272 13.409 33.675 0.685 74.356
FRA 1993 2011 36.177 12.514 26.556 4.111 79.358
GBR 1990 2011 21.11 8.693 36.584 26.032 92.419
GRC 1990 2011 34.011 7.142 15.43 0.984 56.583
HKG 1990 2011 68.83 11.604 39.323 15.192 134.949
HRV 2001 2011 61.143 32.591 9.446 103.18
HUN 1990 2011 15.393 3.325 5.279 3.316 27.313
IDN 2002 2011 15.269 5.33 1.994 2.44 25.033
IND 2001 2011 25.292 3.259 3.248 2.364 34.163
ISL 2003 2011 14.132 41.737 55.869
ISR 1999 2011 57.681 10.545 20.44 88.666
ITA 1998 2011 22.691 2.776 23.921 11.673 61.061
JPN 1990 2011 56.62 3.211 28.048 8.538 96.417
LTU 1993 2011 18.373 2.981 7.35 1.732 30.436
LUX 1999 2011 30.183 8.318 33.755 50.92 123.176
MAR 2001 2011 14.651 2.906 11.232 0.293 28.789
MEX 2000 2011 7.955 3.109 8.69 19.754
NLD 1990 2011 49.114 8.104 60.016 19.99 137.224
NOR 1995 2011 33.606 11.069 49.059 2.875 96.609
NZL 1990 2011 32.034 4.846 55.136 25.089 117.105
POL 1996 2011 14.785 9.476 7.048 1.201 32.51
PRT 1990 2011 41.924 11.202 37.904 10.876 101.906
SGP 1990 2011 59.365 23.2 13.397 95.962
SVK 2004 2011 19.773 4.337 11.163 2.403 37.676
SVN 2004 2011 48.487 11.476 8.729 4.933 73.625
SWE 1996 2011 55.302 11.221 40.686 48.119 155.328
TWN 1997 2011 70.616 19.951 38.949 3.426 132.942
UKR 2005 2011 39.58 19.441 5.243 64.264
URY 2005 2011 13.883 8.908 22.791
USA 1990 2011 9.547 6.032 18.823 34.402
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Figure A.1: The developments of credit composition over time - Selected Countries
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Figure A.2: The developments of credit composition over time - Selected Countries (Cont.)
(a) Japan
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Table A.3: Country coverage
AUS, BDI, BFA, BHS, BOL, CIV, CMR, CRI, DOM, ECU,
EGY, FIN, FJI, GAB, GHA, GMB, GRC, GTM, HND, IND,
IRL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KEN, KOR, LKA, MDG, MEX, MLT,
MYS, NER, NGA, NPL, PAK, PAN, PER, PHL, PRT, PRY,
SEN, SGP, SLV, SWZ, TGO, THA, TTO, TUR, URY, USA
Table A.4: Industry coverage across countries
ALB(11), AUS(36), AUT(36), BEL(36), BGR(36), BRA(12), CAN(35), CHE (18), CHL(30),
CZE(31), DEU(36), DNK(32), EGY(36), ESP(36), EST(36), FIN(34), FRA(36), GBR(36),
GRC(36), HKG(9), HUN(36), IDN(36), IND(32), ISL(29), ISR(24), ITA(36), JPN(36),
LTU(36), LUX(29), MAR(36), MEX(36), NLD(36), NOR(36), NZL(14), POL(36), PRT(36),
SGP(36), SVK(34), SVN(36), SWE(36), TWN(28), URY(33), USA(34)
Note: The number in the parenthesis indicates the number of industries available.
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Table A.5: Industry classification and external financial dependence
ISIC code Sector External Dependence (ED)
311 Food products 0.14
313 Beverages 0.08
314 Tobacco -0.45
321 Textiles 0.4
322 Apparel 0.03
323 Leather -0.14
324 Footwear -0.08
331 Wood products 0.28
332 Furniture 0.24
341 Paper products 0.18
342 Printing and publishing 0.2
352 Other chemical products 0.22
353 Refineries 0.04
354 Petroleum and coal 0.33
355 Rubber products 0.23
356 Plastic products 1.14
361 Pottery -0.15
362 Glass and products 0.53
369 Non-metal products 0.06
371 Iron and steel 0.09
372 Non-ferrous metal 0.01
381 Metal products 0.24
382 Machinery 0.45
383 Electrical machinery 0.77
384 Transport equipment 0.31
385 Professional equipment 0.96
390 Other manufacturing 0.47
3211 Spinning -0.09
3411 Pulp and paper 0.15
3511 Basic chemicals 0.25
3513 Synthetic resins 0.16
3522 Drugs 1.49
3825 Office and computing 1.06
3832 Radio 1.04
3841 Ship building 0.46
3843 Motor vehicles 0.39
Note: The external dependence on finance is taken from Rajan and
Zingales (1998).
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